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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

LOANS FROM SHAREHOLDERS
DURING CHAPTER 11 CASE PRIME
EXISTING UNDERSECURED
MORTGAGEES

In today's depressed real estate
market, it is not uncommon for
owners of commercial property
who are facing foreclosure to seek
protection under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code). The
automatic stay under Section 362 of
the Code gives the debtor breathing
room to attempt to negotiate a consensual reorganization plan with
mortgagees and other creditors.
However, the absence of equity
above the existing mortgages renders it difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain new financing for repairs,
maintenance, and renovations that
may be needed to return the property to a profitable venture.
A possible source of new financing may be the existing shareholders
of the debtor corporation. Of
course, shareholders may make new
equity investments in the debtor.
* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra U niversity School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.

However, one of the most controversial and unsettled issues in the
bankruptcy field today is whether
the "absolute priority rule" set
forth in Section 1129(b) of the Code
is violated if (1) a chapter 11 plan
provides that shareholders making
new capital contributions will continue to own the reorganized debtor
and (2) the plan is "crammed
down" against an unwilling class
of creditors receiving less than full
payment of their claims. The viability of this "new v.alue exception"
to the absolute priority rule has been
called into question by many courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court. 1
Another way that shareholders
may invest in the debtor is to provide
new fmancing in the form ofloans.
"However, a different question may
arise as to whether shareholders
making a new loan to the debtor,
instead of a capital contribution,
may obtain a senior lien on the property that primes existing mortgagees
who are already undersecured.
When does Section 364(d), which
1
See, e.g., Northwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988); Kham
& Nate's Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank, 908
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Drimmel,
108 Bankr. 284, (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
Compare, e.g., In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership, 134 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. D. Md.
1991 ); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 Bankr.
971 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1990).
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permits the granting of senior liens
to new lenders, permit shareholders
to prime mortgagees? Can the interests of existing mortgagees be adequately protected? Does the granting of a senior lien to a shareholder
run afoul of the absolute priority
rule that is mandated by Section
1129(b) of the Code? A recent case
that focuses on these issues is In re
495 CentralParkAvenue Corp. 2
The Facts

The primary asset of the debtor,
495 Central Park Avenue Corp., is
real property located in Scarsdale,
New York, where the debtor has
leased space to various commercial
tenants. The debtor had acquired
the premises in April1991 subject to
an existing $3.95 million mortgage
held by John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company. Although the
debtor did not assume the promissory note held by John Hancock and
the seller remained liable on the note
for any deficiency in the event of a
foreclosure, the debtor nonetheless
had to pay the mortgage to avoid
foreclosure. In addition, the debtor
gave the seller cash and a purchase
money mortgage of $200,000 that
was subordinate to John Hancock's
mortgage.
The debtor defaulted on the first
mortgage and, as a result, John Hancock accelerated the balance of the
debt, which totaled approximately
$3.94 million, and commenced
foreclosure proceedings in state

court in August 1991. The foreclosure was stayed when the debtor
filed a chapter 11 petition in September.3
The debtor filed a motion in bankruptcy court requesting an order
permitting it to obtain credit under
Section 364(d) of the Code, either
from its two shareholders or from
third-party lenders supported by
personal guarantees of the shareholders, and permitting the new
lenders to obtain a security interest
senior to all existing mortgages. The
amount of the new credit would be
approximately $650,000.
John Hancock opposed the debtor's motion and at the hearing before the bankruptcy judge argued
that the debtor had failed to demonstrate that the requirements of Section 364(d)4 had been met. John
Hancock also argued that "the motion should be denied because subordination of its position would violate 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) which
provides that secured claims are

2
In re 495 Central Park Ave. Corp., 136
Bankr. 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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3
4

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
11 U .S.C. § 364{d) provides that:
(1) The court, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of
debt secured by a senior or equal
lien on property of the estate that is
subject to a lien only if(A) the trustee is unable to obtain
such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the
interest of the holder of the lien on
the property of the estate on which
such senior or equal lien is proposed
to be granted.
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of
proof on the issue of adequate protection."
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entitled to priority over junior
claims. " 5 The second mortgagee
did not oppose the motion.
The Need for New Financing
At the hearing, one of the shareholders, who also is the president of
the debtor, testified that borrowing
money was necessary to make structural changes in the building to attract new tenants. Additionally, two
of the debtor's primary tenants were
experiencing fmancial difficulties
and were paying rent that was substantially lower than the market
rate. The leases of these primary
tenants had expired and they were
continuing to occupy the premises
on a month-to-month basis paying
rent that was less than the rent required under the expired leases.
This substantial decrease in the rental income of the debtor had caused
a significant depreciation in the value of the building. Appraisers for
both parties testified that the low
rental income generated by the
building contributed to the decline
of its market value.
The president also testified that
the owner of a chain of furniture
stores that operated in New York
City expressed serious interest in
renting space in the building. The
agent for the furniture retailer stated
in a letter that they were prepared
to enter into a 15-year lease for a
portion of the space that one of the
two primary tenants was occupying,
but the debtor would be required to
spend $62,000 towards the cost of
' 136 Bankr. at 628.
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constructing a functional retail
store; the new tenant would invest
the rest of the $250,000 needed for
store construction costs. However,
additional renovations to the building would also be required at the
debtor's expense. The debtor also
would be required to grant the tenant
rent-freeoccupancy for the first seven months, which is customary in
the current economic climate.
Inability to Obtain Financing
The president of the debtor testified concerning his efforts to borrow money on behalf of the debtor
from various fmancial institutions to
fund the cost of renovations. Every
bank he approached had refused to
lend the debtor money despite the
shareholders' offers to guarantee
the debt personally. This testimony
was supported by the testimony of a
bank commercial loan officer, who
was certified as an expert in commercial lending practices under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 The
loan officer testified ''that, in his
opinion, all legitimate financial institutions would refuse to lend the
debtor money because such a loan
would be junior to Hancock's secured position.'' He explained that
"banks ordinarily demand a first
position on commercial real estate
6
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

188

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

loans and that a junior lien or an
administrative priority simply will
notsuffice." 7

prove postpetition financing granting the new lender a lien that is
senior to existing liens.

Testimony on Valuation
The debtor's real estate appraiser, employing the income approach
to valuation that is based on the
net income that the property was
currently producing, concluded that
the building was presently worth
$2.25 million. However, he also
testified that if the debtor invested
$625,000 to ren_9vate the property,
the value of the building would increase immediately to $3.5 million
based on the current discounted value of the increased rental income
that he predicted would be generated during the next seven years. His
estimate was that the building would
be worth $4 million in three years
and $5 million in five years. John
Hancock's appraiser, also employing the income approach to valuation, testified that the building
was presently worth $2.2 million
and after the proposed renovations
it would be worth approximately
$2.8 million.
Both experts agreed that if improvements to the property were
made with the proposed borrowed
funds, the property would increase
in value. The disagreement was
only with respect to the extent of the
increase.

The first prong of 11 U .S.C. Section
364(d) requires the debtor to show
that alternate financing is unavailable. Because super priority financing displaces liens on which creditors
have relied in extending credit, the
debtor must demonstrate to the court
that it cannot obtain financing by
other means. The Bankruptcy Code
permits a debtor to borrow money in
various ways less onerous to secured
creditors. 8

Requirements Under Section
364(d)
Section 364(d) permits the court,
under certain circumstances, to ap-

These various ways include giving the lender ( 1) an unsecured administrative expense claim with priority status under Section 507(a)(1)
of the Code; (2) an unsecured administrative expense claim that is
senior to all other administrative
expense claims; and (3) a junior
lien. 9 Only after the debtor has exhausted all efforts to obtain financing by any of these various means
is Section 364(d) available to grant
the lender a lien that is senior or
equal to existing liens. 10
The court was persuaded that,
apart from granting a senior lien
under Section 364(d), the debtor
was not able to obtain credit. ''Section 364(d)(1) does not require the
debtor to seek alternate financing
from every possible lender. However, the debtor must make an effort
to obtain credit without priming a
8

/d. at630.
See 11 U.S.C. § 364.
10
See U .S.C. § 364(d).

9
7

136 Bankr. at 629.
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senior lien. " 11 The debtor's president had made such an effort, but
no one was willing to lend the debtor
money as an administrative expense, as an expense senior to all
other administrative claims, or secured by a lien junior to Hancock's
mortgage. Moreover, the debtor
could not obtain financing secured
by a lien on unencumbered property
because there was no property in
the estate that had not already been
subject to a lien.
Adequate Protection
The second prong of Section
364(d) requires the debtor to show
that the interests of holders of existing liens on the property are adequately protected. The Code does
not expressly define adequate protection, but Section 361 sets forth
examples. The court stated that
these illustrations are not exclusive,
and that a broad and flexible definition is suggested by Section 361(3),
which provides that adequate protection may be satisfied by "granting such other relief . . . as will
result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of
such entity's interest in such property ... 12
The court commented that the
goal of adequate protection was to
safeguard the secured creditor from
diminution in the value of its interest
during the chapter 11 reorganiza11

12

136 Bankr. at 631.
11 u.s.c. § 361(3).
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tion. 13 To determine whether John
Hancock was adequately protected,
the court had to consider whether
the value of the debtor's property
would increase as a result of the
renovations funded by the proposed
financing. Although the appraisers
disagreed as to what the value of
the building would be following the
infusion of $650,000, the court
found that the proposed improvements would probably cause the
property to increase in value to approximately $3 million. That represents an increase of $800,000 over
the $2.2 million current appraised
value according to John Hancock's
appraiser.
In light of the fact that the projected
property improvements to be made
with the requested credit will· exceed
the $650,000 loan, it follows that
Hancock's secured interest will be
adequately protected after the approval of the proposed $650,000 senior loan .... In effect, a substitution
occurs in that the money spent for
improvements will be transferred
into value. This value will serve as
adequate protection for Hancock's
secured claim. 14

Absolute Priority Rule Does Not
Apply
The court also rejected John Hancock's argument that Section
1129(b) prevents the debtor's shareholders from injecting new value
13
The court cited Bank of New Eng. v.
BWL, Inc., 121 Bankr. 413, 418 (D. Me.
1990); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 58 Bankr.

725, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1986).
14
136 Bankr. at 630-631.
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in the property and maintaining ~n
ownership interest. "This section
essentially provides that a plan of
reorganization may not be confirmed if it unfairly discriminates or
is not fair and equitable with respect
to each class of claims. Under the
statute, a plan may not be confirmed
if a holder of claim or interest that
is junior to the claim of a nonconsenting secured class would receive
property on behalf of its claim before senior claims are fully repaid. " 15
The court observed that the Code
does not provide for a ''new value
exception" to the absolute priority
rule, but that several courts have
recognized such an exception. "Under the exception, a plan may be
confirmed when equity holders contribute new capital to retain an ownership interest in the reorganized
debtor. " 16 John Hancock urged the
court to follow those decisions that
have rejected the new value exception to the absolute priority rule. 17
However, the court rejected HanIS

fd. at 632.

16

!d. The court cited In re Woodscape

Limited Partnership, 134 Bankr. 165
(Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
17
John Hancock urged the court to follow the opinion of the court of appeals in
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grey stone
III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.
1991 ), in which the court, in dictum, rejected
the new value exception. On petition for
rehearing a majority of the three-judge panel
withdrew that portion of its original opinion
that commented on the new value exception.
Circuit Court Judge Edith Jones, who wrote
the original opinion, dissented and reaffirmed her position rejecting the ''new value
exception."

cock's argument as being irrelevant
to the debtor's motion.
Whether or not the new value concept
is an exception to the absolute priority rule is an issue which need not be
addressed in the context of a motion
for senior credit pursuant to 11
U.S. C. § 364(d). The absolute priority rule is a confirmation standard
which does not apply to a preconfrrmation contested matter involving a
debtor's request to obtain senior
credit. If the debtor is unable to obtain credit without giving a senior or
equal lien as security, the debtor may
obtain credit secured by a senior or
equal lien in accordance with
§ 364(d) only if the holders of senior
or equal liens on the property are
adequately protected. In such case,
the critical issue is adequate protection and not absolutely priority. 18

Conclusion
The bankruptcy court in 495 Central Park Avenue granted the debtor's motion for authority to borrow
money from its shareholders and to
give the loan senior priority status
that primes the existing first mortgage of John Hancock. Although
courts are not in agreement on the
viability of the new value exception
to the absolute priority rule, it is
clear that courts may permit shareholders who provide postpetition financing that improves the value of
the debtor's property to obtain senior lien status if existing liens are
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18

136 Bankr. at 632.
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adequately protected. 19 The essence
19

Compare Weintraub & Resnick, "Equitable Subordination of the Postpetition Financer and the Use of Shareholder Guarantees to Escape the Absolute Priority Rule:
Lessons from the Seventh Circuit," 24
U.C.C.L.J. 400(Spring 1992).
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of the court's holding was that the
absolute priority rule applies only
in the context of confirmation of a
plan and that it is unrelated to the
rights of shareholders as postpetition lenders.
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